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Introduction
This article addresses some of the legal challenges arising from non-interna- 
tional armed conflicts, arguing that the general principles of international human­
itarian law do not fully meet the requirements of the task. Particularly, I will ad­
dress the issue of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the law of occupation. To 
address these issues, I will refer the concept of counterinsurgency and insurgency. 
It helps better understand the dynamics related to the modern armed conflicts. 
The principle of distinction will be presented as part of the discussion on the role 
of military-oriented humanitarian projects, such as the Provincial Reconstruc­
tion Teams. Further, the article will refer to the validity of the law of occupation 
in the light of concepts such as ius post bellum from the perspective of modern 
counterinsurgency.
Humanitarian Law vs. Modern Conflict
The law of armed conflict, also known as the laws of war or international hu­
manitarian law, was developed and codified to govern state-to-state conflicts.1 
That was ideological, moral and ethical assumption or background behind the 
creation of humanitarian law. The traditional, symmetrical warfare is to be under­
stood as an armed conflict between states of roughly equal military strength2. War­
1 L. Blank, A. Guiora, ‘Teaching an old dog new tricks. Operationalizing the law of 
armed conflict in new warfare’, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 1 (2010), p. 45.
2 T. Pfanner, ‘Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Hu­
manitarian Action’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857 (2005), p. 152, http:// 
dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1816383100181238.
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ring parties operate under similar principles using similar means and methods of 
warfare3. In traditional conflicts, the need to destroy an enemy has traditionally 
been considered the centre of gravity, reflecting the concept of Frederick the Great 
of “complete destruction of one’s enemies” which can be accomplished by death, 
injury, or any other means4.
3 E. Benvenisti, ‘The legal battle to define the law on transnational asymmetric warfare’, 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 20 (2010), p. 340.
4 G. Sitaraman, ‘Counterinsurgency, the war on terror, and the laws of war’, Virginia Law 
Review, Vol. 95 (2009), p. 1751.
5 D. Stephens, ‘Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations. A New Approach to Legal 
Interpretation’ in R.A. Pedrozo (ed.)> The War in Iraq. A Legal Analysis, Newport 2010, p. 291.
6 E. Benvenisti, ‘The legal battle...’, p. 339.
7 Ibid., p. 339.
8 Field Manual, op. cit., p. 1-28.
’ G. Sitaraman,‘Counterinsurgency...’, p. 1757.
1(1 T. Pfanner, ‘Asymmetrical Warfare...’, p. 158.
However, modern conflicts are - in most cases - non-international in charac­
ter. During such conflicts, non-state actors employ asymmetric means and meth­
ods against state military forces.5 Inequalities in arms and significant disparity 
between belligerents have become a prominent feature of various contemporary 
armed conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan. The spread of innovations like 
portable hand-held missiles, difficult to detect or undetectable explosives, and 
communication tools offered loosely-organized insurgents affordable and effective 
means of confronting stronger opponents.6 Democratization or privatization of 
the means of warfare provided opportunities for non-state actors to challenge not 
only their own governments but also the international powers7 and superpowers.
Additionally in conventional conflicts the centre of gravity of the military op­
erations was to kill or capture the enemy or its military forces. Current conflicts 
show a significant change in emphasis. The centre of gravity is a civilian popula­
tion and the war is often conducted to win the “hearts and minds” of the popu­
lation.8 What is more, the traditional doctrine to kill and capture is sometimes 
changed to a more holistic one. The new “win-the-population” doctrine imposes 
different types of obligation on military forces.9 The only effective way of “win­
ning” a modern armed conflict is to bring stability, sound economy and rules of 
law. For that purpose, military means and methods have to be mixed with policing 
ones. Currently as Pfanner argues “it is debatable whether the challenges of asym­
metrical war can be met with the contemporary law of war”.10 It seems that the 
current situation may require modification of rules of international humanitarian 
law. The most recent substantive amendments to Geneva law occurred with the 
adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. Since 
then, despite rapid development in international law, little has been done to ad­
dress burning questions of modern humanitarian law, notwithstanding the adop­
tion of instruments restricting or prohibiting the use of certain types of weapon, 
including anti-personnel landmines.
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Modern Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency (COIN) in general “is military, paramilitary, politi­
cal, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
insurgency”.11 This non-legally binding definition embraces a broad spectrum of 
activities.12 A counterinsurgents task is different from a conventional warriors 
one. He or she is supposed to work smarter rather than harder during planning 
and executing counterinsurgency strategy.13 Since insurgents derive their support 
from the local population, only when the local population turns against the insur­
gency can counterinsurgency be considered successful”.14 This approach requires 
a multidisciplinary approach both from scholars and practitioners. During mod­
ern counterinsurgency operations it is necessary for military forces to melt into 
local environment by collecting tribal and demographical intelligence as well as 
threat intelligence.15 It is also vital to require knowledge on subjects such as gov­
ernance, economic development, public administration and the rule of law.16
" U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. U.S. Army Field 
Manual No. 3-24. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Chicago 2007, p. 1.1 50 
McGill L.J. 285 (hereinafter: COIN Manual).
12 J. Kelly, ‘Legal aspects of military operations in counterinsurgency’, Military Law Re­
view, Vol. 21 (1963), p. 95.
15 D. Stephens, ‘Counterinsurgency...’, p. 292.
14 G. Sitaraman, ‘Counterinsurgency...’, p. 1773.
15 D. Kilcullen, ‘Intelligence’ in T. Rid, T. Keaney, Understanding Counterinsurgency. 
Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, Routledge-London 2010, p. 147.
16 COIN Manual, p. X.
17 G. Sitaraman,‘Counterinsurgency...’, p. 1770.
■" D. Kilcullen, ‘Intelligence’, p. 5.
” COIN Manual, p. 1-149, 1-153, 1-150, 1-151.
2,1 Ibid., p. 1-19.
Modern counterinsurgency operations are not a new development, but they 
have never before seemed to be so essential to future conflicts.17 Counterinsur­
gencyembraces holistic activities orientated on civilian population. Killing the op­
ponent is considered a last resort.18 This argument is supported by gen David Pe­
traeus in his Manual on Counterinsurgency where he presents some of the major 
principles of conducting anti insurgency operations. They are as follow: a) some­
times, the more you protect your force the less secure you may be, b) some of the 
best weapon for counterinsurgent is do not shoot, c) sometimes, the more force is 
used, the less effective it is, and d) the more successful the counterinsurgency is, 
the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted.19
During counterinsurgency operations shift of the weight has to be addressed 
on defensive, and stability operations. In particular it is civil security, essential 
services, governance, economic and infrastructure development.20 The balance 
of offensive and defensive operations is essential to counterinsurgency. In that 
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respect COIN differs from peacekeeping operation. In peacekeeping operations 
absence of violence is a goal. In COIN situation the goal is much more compound 
where lack of violence may mask insurgents preparation for combat.21 However 
the cornerstone of any counterinsurgency is to establish security for the civilian 
population. Without secure environment, no reforms can be implemented.22 Se­
curity based not on military presence in military bases and travelling in armoured 
vehicles from point A to B, but rather on proximity to the local population, foot 
patrolling etc.23 To be successful in counterinsurgency troops have to engage with 
the populace. Close contact with local population allows soldiers to learn to un­
derstand social environment, to build trust and to have opportunity to obtain in­
telligence.24 According to gen Petraeus “kindness and compassion can often be 
as important as killing and capturing insurgents”.25 To successfully counter insur­
gents one must also heavily rely on the indigenous security and military forces. It 
embraces sponsoring, training and mentoring local forces.
21 Ibid., p. 1-20.
22 Ibid., p. 1-23, par. 1-131.
21 D. Kilcullen, ‘Intelligence’, p. 35.
24 COIN Manual, p. 5-9, table 5-1.
25 Ibid., p. 5-12, table 5-2.
26 Ibid., p. 1-24, par. 1-132.
All parties to the asymmetric conflict conduct both civilian and military ac­
tions. Insurgents are blended with the civilian population as the enemy moves 
within and through the population, whereas the governmental and foreign armed 
forces carry out projects which are often not military in nature. As a result dur­
ing counterinsurgency operation it is difficult to define what military effort is and 
what is not. This issue have to be considered with the one fundamental assumption 
in mind. Observance of humanitarian and human rights law is in case of coun­
terinsurgency of an utmost importance. Any human rights or humanitarian law 
abuse committed by intervening forces - apart from strictly moral dimension has 
also a pragmatic one. Each such an event quickly becomes known throughout the 
local population and eventually around the world. Illegitimate actions undermine 
counterinsurgency effort in both long and short term aspect.26
Provincial Reconstruction Team
One of the best known ISAF programmes, which constitutes a part of coun­
terinsurgency effort, is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) project. 
Such teams operate in each province under control of the ISAF countries and 
coordinate, develop, and fund local projects. Their aim is to rebuild the country 
in cooperation with local population which is to determine what is needed to 
make society stable and secure from the insurgent ideology. Provincial Recon­
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struction Teams are considered as a mean to extend the reach and enhance the 
legitimacy of the central government. They usually consist of 50 to 300 troops 
and representatives of development and diplomatic agencies.27 In secure areas 
PRTs maintain low profile whereas in more volatile PRTs work closely with com­
bat units and local government.28 In every case PRTs activity embraces security 
sector reform, building local governance, reconstruction and development.29 
Despite their humanitarian agenda they constitute an element of counterinsur­
gency warfare with military aims as a goal. These projects are used to gain the 
trust and support of the local population and this way supporting the counter­
insurgency efforts. The Provincial Reconstruction Team may be seen as military 
answer addressing the security sector reform, reconstruction, development and 
governance which are domains of humanitarian organizations.30 But in reality 
the establishment of PRT by the Coalition forces in Afghanistan has blurred the 
lines between the role and objectives of political and military players on the one 
hand and humanitarian players on the other.
27 Ibid., p. 2-12, par. 2-51.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
311 R.J. Bebber, 'The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Counterinsur­
gency Operations: Khost Province, Afghanistan’, Small Wars Journal, 31 March 2011.
31 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force 21 Oc­
tober 1950.
32 ICRC Commentary on GC I, p. 53, at <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/365-570006? 
OpenDocument>.
The question of the legality of the PRT is important. PRTs focus their humani­
tarian activity on civilian population. But it has to be noted that PRTs are included 
in the military structure. Personnel engaged in these projects wear uniforms and 
are under military chain of command and responsibility. These projects are orien­
tated toward a military (politically motivated) gain. As such their activities blur the 
line between what is and what is not military action and may affect the principle 
of distinction.
It is difficult to establish a legal framework for PRT activities. This is because 
it is a new invention, not regulated by humanitarian law. To address legal ramifica­
tion of PRT it is necessary to refer to the already existing humanitarian law norms. 
Common article 3 says “in the case of armed conflict not of an international char­
acter [...] each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions: Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, [...] shall in 
all circumstances be treated humanely”.31 Lengthy definition of expressions such 
as “humane treatment” or “to treat humanely” is unnecessary, as they have entered 
sufficiently into current parlance to be understood.32 So humanitarian projects 
run by military forces may be considered as being correspondent with the com­
mon Art. 3. Similarly Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol II also states the 
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principle of humanitarian treatment by art. 4.33 A good example is provided by 
Art. 4.3 of AP II which states that children shall be provided [...] (a) education. 
This corresponds to the PRTs activity in terms of building schools and providing 
relevant educational materials such as books. The above mentioned regulations 
indicate that treaty law does not forbid humanitarian activities which enter within 
the scope PRTs effort.
” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 
entered into force 7 December 1978.
34 Art. 48 API.
35 International Institute of Humanitarian Law, The Manual on the Law of Non-Interna- 
tional Armed Conflict With Commentary, p. 11, at <http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/NIAC- 
ManualIYBHR15th.pdf>.
36 ICRC Customary rules index, at <http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/ 
vl_rul_rule8>.
37 Ibid.
The analysis becomes more complicated if we try to look at the legal constraints 
of the PRTs activity from the perspective of the principle of distinction. The prin­
ciple of distinction holds that “parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against mili­
tary objectives”.34 The principle is expanded to non-international armed conflict 
by article 13 of Additional Protocol II which provides that “the civilian population 
and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers aris­
ing from military operations”.35 The importance of the principle is highlighted by 
art 85 (3) (a) Additional Protocol I, which states that violation of the principle of 
distinction is deemed a grave breach and under art 85 (5) a war crime. Addition­
ally the principle of distinction attained customary status which means that it is 
applicable for both international and non-international armed conflicts (also these 
regulated only by common Art. 3 of Geneva Conventions).
This issue becomes even more complex when we approach the notion of mili­
tary objectives. AP II applicable during non international conflict such as in Af­
ghanistan has little to say about the principle of distinction in terms of military 
objectives. In this respect customary law is more specific. Rule 8 of the ICRC study 
on customary law says: “In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are 
limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, 
capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage”.36 This definition of military objectives is currently “widely 
accepted”.37
PRTs effort is an intrinsic part of counterinsurgency and constitutes an effec­
tive contribution to military effort, in the sense that it enhances the likelihood of 
success. Every school, every police building, every road and every hospital built by 
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PRT forms a part of the military counterinsurgency measures. It is a part of a battle 
for “hearts and minds”. It is smart, it is pragmatic but it is still warfare. Especially 
since PRTs are responsible not only for construction of civilians orientated build­
ings like schools but also for construction buildings which are police or military in 
nature such as for example police academy in Nuristan Province.38 It some respect 
it resembles the situation of the Israel in occupied territories. Building infrastruc­
ture of governance increases governmental control over the land. Although infra­
structure is civilian, the results are military and they constitute a response toward 
insurgency.39 PRTs projects are positively resulting on behalf of central govern­
ment in Kabul. Thus they directly support both governmental control over prov­
inces and actions against former, Taliban government. So the question is whether 
military built objects are military objectives?
” Army Staff Sgt. G. Caligiuri, ‘Nuristan PRT brings professional training to ANP’, at 
<http://www.blackanthem.com/News/Allies_20/Nuristan_PRT_brings_professional_train- 
ing_to_ANP5055.shtml>, 24 November 2011.
” G. S w i n e y, ‘Saving Lives. The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern War’, 
The International Lawyer, Vol. 39 (2005), p. 754.
COIN Manual, p. 3-1, par. 3-4.
41 It is also disputable. For insurgents destruction of the school offers a definite military 
advantage when hearts and minds or terrorizing of the local community is at stake.
There are two possible ways of qualifying PRT projects in legal terms. The first 
option is that we will consider the status of schools, and other community orien­
tated constructions, as military. It is because all NATOs PRT sponsored actions 
could be considered as a winning hearts and minds strategy. It is part of counter­
insurgency and offers definite military advantage. This approach is supported by 
the gen Petraeus position presented in COIN manual. According to him “all opera­
tions have an intelligence (military) component. All soldiers and marines collect 
information whenever they interact with population. Operations should therefore 
always include intelligence collection requirements”.40 As a result of such approach 
PRTs projects and achievements need to be considered as a military objectives and 
legitimate target.
The second option is to accept PRT activity as partially civilian in character 
and exclude their results from being considered as legitimate targets for insur­
gents. PRT staff is included in the military chain of command and responsibility. 
They wear uniforms and a distinctive sign. They are protected by military escort. 
While performing their task they are legitimate target. But when their task is fin­
ished a school or a road which was built becomes a civilian object protected by the 
humanitarian law.41
Nowadays there is no alternative to military-sponsored aid. PRTs are part of 
a counterinsurgency effort. Their actions may affect principle of distinction. But 
also there is little choice. Only governments are able to provide the amount of 
money which significantly changes the situation in places like Afghanistan. Only 
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governments are able to provide some form of protection to PRT specialists. In 
asymmetric, non-international armed conflict PRTs are a necessary element.
Law of Occupation from the Perspective of Modern Conflicts
Provincial Reconstruction Teams are an element of a bigger phenomenon i.e. 
a responsibility to bring the particular state to stability. Their activities are often 
conducted within the framework of nation building or quasi occupation. The im­
portant question here is what is and what is not allowed under the law of occu­
pation? Is it allowed under international law to use PRT to change the country? 
These questions bring us to the issue whether PRTs activities violate the law of 
occupation.42
42 G.T. Harris, ‘The Era of Multilateral Occupation’, Berkeley Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 24 (2006), p. 2. More on notion of occupied territory see: Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 
Reports 136, p. 78 (9 July): “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under 
the authority of the hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised”.
43 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regu­
lations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.
44 Ch. Garraway, ‘From relevance of jus post bellum. A practitioner’s perspective’ in 
C. Stahn, J.K. Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition, from Conflict to Peace, 
Hague 2008, p. 153.
45 Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge 2009, p. 7.
46 G.H. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation, Cambridge 2008, p. 238.
The legal status of the occupier is regulated by the 1907 Hague Regulation 
(articles 42-56). The most relevant article 43 states: “the authority of the legitimate 
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all 
the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order 
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country”.43 This regulation (already in existence for more than a hundred years) 
reflects the position at that time. The final status of occupied territory was a matter 
to be resolved by the parties in a peace treaty. In the meantime, the task of interna­
tional law was to preserve status quo.44
Complementary to the Hague Regulation was the IV Geneva Convention re­
lating to the protection of civilian persons in time of war45 - particularly articles 
27-34 and 47- 48 which refer to the legal obligations of the occupier. These articles 
establish a minimum standard of governance.46 IV GC also introduces a cessation 
of the applicability of Convention. It states in Art. 6 “that the application of the 
present Convention shall cease on the general closure of military operations. In 
the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease 
one year after the general closure of military operations”. Additional Protocol I de­
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velops these standards. As a supplementary to treaty law several customary rules 
were also recorded in the ICRC study on particular aspects of occupation.47 Short 
summary of the treaty law and customary law indicates that occupation should 
fulfil three assumptions: occupation is temporary, non transformative, and limited 
in scope.48 As a result any attempt to permanently reform or change an occupied 
state would be unlawful.49 But the premise that occupiers will preserve status quo 
ante, as convincingly Kirsten Bonn writes, demonstrated to be a fiction.50 The is­
sue related to the applicability of the law of occupation is that the consistent and 
almost universal disuse of it calls into question to what extent this branch of hu­
manitarian law retains legal authority.51 State practice indicates almost no compli­
ance with the law of occupation; this is sometimes illustrated by the general lack 
of meaningful international condemnation when it is disregarded.52 As Harris says 
“the law of occupation long had been in a state of innocuous desuetude”.53 What 
makes this law even less relevant to modern challenge is that the main body of 
treaty and customary regulations are applicable only during an occupation result­
ing out of international armed conflict.
47 See: rule 41 and 51 of ICRC study on customary law, at <http://www.icrc.org/ 
customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl_cha_chapterl2_rule41?OpenDocument&highlight=occupation>.
4" N. Bhuta, ‘The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, European Journal of Inter­
national Law, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2005), p. 726, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chil45. See: Hague 
Convention (IV) on respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regula­
tions concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. Art. 55: 
“The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public build­
ings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in 
the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in 
accordance with the rules of usufruct”.
49 G.T. Harris, ‘The Era...’, p. 9. “For example change of the laws of the occupant is per­
missible if ‘necessitated’ by the occupant’s interest or by military necessity”. Prof. Openheim 
quoted by the E.H Schwenk in ‘Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under Article 43 
Hague Regulations’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2 (1945), p. 400.
511 K.E. Boon, ‘Legislative Reform in Post-conflict Zones. Jus Post Bellum and the Con­
temporary Occupant’s Law-Making Powers’, McGill Journal of Law, Vol. 50 (2005), p. 306.
51 G.T. Harris,‘The Era...’, p. 11. Similar situation of transformative occupation took place 
not only in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and 
East Timor just to mention a few. More on it see: N. Bhuta, ‘The Antinomies...’, pp. 735-736.
52 G.T. H a r r i s, ‘The Era...’, p. 11. It is difficult to find any example of occupation which is 
conducted according to all principles of occupation law within last 100 years.
53 Ibid., p. 10.
If law of occupation importance has decreased in recent years, than the ques­
tion is what next? Should the intervening states rebuild the country which was 
invaded? Is international community responsible for Afghanistan or other conflict 
areas? It seems that the answer is yes. Without positive western world contribution 
these areas may turn into rouge states where human rights violations occur and 
international terrorism and organized crime finds shelter.
258 Piotr Lubiński
Is There a Need for a New Law?
Popularity of the PRTs, the new approach to counterinsurgency and law of 
occupation desuetudo brings us to a concept which embraces all of it i.e. ius post 
bellum. It is a broad concept embracing both conflict and post conflict societies.54 
It is perceived as a framework to deal with challenges of post conflict transforma­
tion and state building. It has also been associated with the conduct of legislative 
reforms in post conflict areas and the consolidation of the rule of law.55 This con­
cept has a long history since it was already recognized by the German philosopher 
and just war theorist, Immanuel Kant, at the end of eighteen century.56 But from 
the perspective of contemporary legal discussion the question is however, whether 
it has any legal meaning.57
54 E. van Zadel, I. Osterdahl, ‘What will jus post bellum mean? Of new wine and old 
bottles’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 14, (2009), p. 176.
55 C. Stahn, ‘Jus post bellum. Mapping the discipline(s)’, American University Internation­
al Law Review, Vol. 23 (2008), p. 321.
56 R.P. DiMeglio, ‘The evolution of Just war tradition. Defining jus post bellum’, Military 
Law Review, Vol. 186 (2005), p. 133.
57 E. van Zadel, I. Osterdahl, ‘What will jus...’, p. 175.
58 C. Stahn, ‘Jus post bellum...’, p. 321.
59 Ibid.
60 S/RES/1483 (2003). This particular Resolution on is interesting. On one hand it support 
law and institution revision when at the same time it support idea of respecting the same laws 
and institutions, what is seems to be contradictory. See Art. 4 Calls upon the Authority, consist­
ent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote 
the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including 
in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the 
creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future; 
where Art. 5 Calls upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international 
law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907. 
The same point of view is represented by many scholars, see: D.J. Scheffer, ‘Beyond Occupa­
tion Law’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 4 (2003), p. 844, http://dx.doi. 
org/10.2307/3133684.
As argued previously, the law of occupation is increasingly perceived as an 
insufficient answer to the legal challenges of peace building58 or modern counter­
insurgency. So the fundamental question is whether ius post bellum can be under­
stood in a normative sense, as a concept which regulates the relationship between 
participants of armed conflict in situations of transition, rather than a moral prin­
ciple or a legal catchphrase.59
The regulation which may indicate the in statu nascendi character of ius post 
bellum is UN SC Resolution 1483.60 The Security Council created a framework 
where the Special Representative of the Secretary General acting in collaboration 
with Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (CPA) was given a specific task to un­
dertake changes in Iraqi infrastructure which went far beyond what might be per­
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mitted under a conservative approach toward the law of occupation.61 As a result 
the CPA adopted over 100 measures designed to remove the legal and institutional 
instruments of the Husain regime.62 The Security Councils resolutions played sim­
ilar role in other “quasi-occupation” situations, such as Kosovo63 and East Timor.64 
This raises questions about the relationship between UN regulations and interna­
tional humanitarian law. To what extent may UN Security Council Resolutions 
supplement and override the provisions of humanitarian law?65 This particularly 
worth looking at in the light of Art. 103 of the UN Charter which states: “in the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”.66 This article 
provides clear interpretation guidance. In case of conflict between treaty law and 
Security Council resolutions the latter overrides.
61 Ch. Garraway,‘From relevance...’, p. 155.
62 B.H. McGurk, ‘Revisiting the law of nation building. Iraq in transition, Virginia Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 45 (2005), p. 461.
63 SC enacted Resolution 1244 which provided a legal basis for the international presence 
with power to build democratic institutions and reform economic structures in Kosovo. This 
resolution did not refer to the international law of occupation although Kosovo was occupied 
by international forces. More on it see: ibid., p. 455.
M Ch. Garraway,‘From relevance...’, p. 155.
63 Ibid.
66 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
67 M. Pugh, ‘The challenges of post conflict intercession. Three issues in international 
politics’ in C. Stahn, J.K. Kleffner, Jus post bellum..., p. 116.
The notion of ius post bellum was utilized not only by Security Council in its 
resolutions but also in other UN documents. For example United Nations Secre­
tary General Boutros Boutros Ghali in his proposal for post conflict peace build­
ing in “Agenda for Peace from 1992 referred to the ius post bellum concept.67 These 
may indicate in statu nascendi process of ius post bellum concept.
This approach of disuse of GC IV leads countries to refer mostly or entirely to 
the UN resolutions which govern multilateral peace or peace enforcement opera­
tions. Taking into consideration the asymmetrical character of modern conflicts, 
nation building and counterinsurgency under the UN umbrella seem to be not 
only an interesting but a necessary option. The Development of the concept of hu­
man rights obliges the international community not only to intervene but also to 
create an environment where mass atrocities/war crimes/genocide are much less 
likely to take place in the future. To prevent this, state building, implementation of 
good governance, and the support of a sound economy have to take place. All these 
activities constitute a broad interpretation of ius post bellum.
Interestingly modern counterinsurgency and ius post bellum share the same 
principles and methods vide Afghanistan or Iraq. In terms of principles both are 
orientated towards bringing and sustaining peace to a civilian population as the 
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centre of gravity. As to the methods, they are orientated toward nation building, 
rule of law and development of the country infrastructure and economy. Of course 
counterinsurgency is only relevant in situations where insurgency exists, whereas 
ius post bellum is relevant both where insurgency exists and situations where it 
does not exist. Counterinsurgency is considered as a method of warfare. Ius post 
bellum is considered as an in statu nascendi legal concept. In both cases PRT is an 
important element of bringing peace and stability.
Conclusion
Modern counterinsurgency rejects kill-capture strategy. Instead, counterin­
surgents follow win-the-population strategy, which is directed on building a stable 
and legitimate political order.68
6" G. Sitaraman,‘Counterinsurgency...’, p. 1745.
69 UNSC Resolution 1674, at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8710.doc.htm>.
711 G. Sitaraman,‘Counterinsurgency...’, p. 1775.
71 Ibid., p. 1788
72 Ibid., p. 1790.
Modern conflicts pose a challenge toward treaty law. Treaty law was created 
to fit conventional wars. Such wars are no longer dominant. A brief analysis of 
the last 60 years of worlds history indicates clearly that international wars consti­
tute a minority. The new standards require not only military interventions with 
humanitarian agenda but also better protection of human rights. This approach 
is confirmed not only by strategists but also by the international community. For 
example, UN Resolution 1674 on importance of preventing conflicts through de­
velopment emphasized the importance of preventing an armed conflict through 
the promotion of economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, 
national reconciliation, good governance, and democracy, the rule of law, as well 
as respect for, and protection of human rights.69 Transformations of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo or East Timor are good examples of such approach. At the 
same time, the lack of engagement of Americans in state building in Afghanistan 
in 1988 after Russian’s withdrawal is an example how things may go wrong. The 
same type of international failure at the beginning of 1990 s led to genocide in 
Rwanda.
Humanitarian law needs to be adapted to work in an asymmetric environment 
of non-international armed conflict. What is allowed under conventional IHL may 
not be acceptable in a modern counterinsurgency policy.70 Killing a member of 
a particular community instead of arresting him may fuel insurgency rather than 
limit it.71 This is because protecting the population is a centre of gravity to the 
counterinsurgents strategy.72 Particularly with the rise of instant communication 
and publicity, any kill-capture operation could easily be found unreasonable by 
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domestic and international opinion and reduce the legitimacy of the intervening 
counterinsurgent forces and their ability to win “hearts and minds”.73
73 Ibid.
74 R. Kuźniar, Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne. Zarys problematyki, Warszawa 2005, 
pp. 294-295.
The issues discussed above share one common feature - uncertainty of ap­
plicability of law. It is difficult to convince a local population that heavy armoured 
vehicle, full of looking like robots soldiers are much needed humanitarian help 
provided by PRT. It is not easy for an Afghan farmer to understand that destruc­
tion of his crops was legal collateral damage under international humanitarian 
law. It is also complicated to convince members of national Shura that the laws 
and types of government which NATO forces support are better than their own, 
hundreds years old system. This uncertainty also applies on global level. States are 
unable or unwilling to intervene in to affairs of other states even failed one. It is 
also difficult to find states willing to provide military or humanitarian support to 
rebuild the state for ten or fifteen years.
New wars where counterinsurgency is fought do not pose strategic threat to 
superpowers such as the USA, the UE or China. However these low intensity con­
flicts may not be left alone. They will be more and more common. Justification of 
the future asymmetric character of the conflicts also lays in economy. According to 
Kuzniar, 16% of worlds population spends 75% of global military expenses. As he 
argues an overwhelming power and range of military burden expenditure of rich 
countries will push poorer countries and entities into asymmetric warfare.74 This 
is why it is so important to face the challenge and try to analyse law applicable dur­
ing modern asymmetrical, non-international armed conflicts. These wars modify 
traditional, conventional laws of war. Humanitarian law created for Eurocentric 
world needs to be foremost applicable in places such as Rwanda or Afghanistan.
Western hemisphere is particularly responsible for bringing peace and stability 
to places where violation of human rights occurs. It is due to fact that most of these 
places were exploited in the past by westerners. This obligation has to be combined 
with rebuilding of a state. It means that maybe it is time to think how to change the 
law in order to meet the challenges of the modern armed conflicts.
Abstract
The establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) by the Coalition 
forces in Afghanistan has blurred the lines between military and civilian targets and has 
affected the principle of distinction. This paper argues the legality of PRT’s activity in Af­
ghanistan and raises general questions addressing legal challenges resulting out of modern 
armed conflict. This issue is particularly important especially taking into consideration 
that modern armed conflict overlaps with responsibility to rebuild of the country where 
the conflict takes place.
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The paper was divided into five substantial parts: Humanitarian law vs. modern con­
flict - which addresses the law applicable during conflicts of our times; modern coun­
terinsurgency - which describes a new approach toward asymmetric conflicts; Provincial 
Reconstruction Team - which addresses a notion of a vital element of a counterinsurgency 
effort; Law of occupation from the perspective of modern conflicts - which discuss that 
law of occupation is not longer as relevant as it was at the time of its creation; Is there 
a need for a new law? - which argues that above mentioned concepts leads to necessity to 
critically approach some element of humanitarian law.
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